Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK, has called for the group’s dissolution, asserting that its mission is now obsolete. In her commentary, Begum Zorlu argues that while there is room for cautious optimism, questions remain about compliance, responses of the ruling coalition, and the future of militants abroad.
Begum Zorlu
The conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state, one of the longest-running insurgencies in the Middle East. Last week, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, has called for the group’s dissolution, asserting that its mission is now obsolete. Is a new door to peace being opened? This post argues that while there is room for cautious optimism, questions remain like compliance, responses of the ruling coalition, and the future of militants abroad.
“I am making a call for the laying down of arms”—these words from imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan represent yet another critical juncture in Turkey’s recent history to solve its long ongoing Kurdish question.
By urging the PKK to dissolve after decades of insurgency, Öcalan’s remarks opened the door to the formation of a new peace initiative, yet there is still vast uncertainty. Will the fighters comply? Will the government re-escalate the conflict and repression? How will the dynamics in the broader Middle East shape the process? It can be said that Turkey’s recent “peace process” remains a puzzle to many of the followers and agents of Turkish politics.
When the talks of a peace process were raised, I witnessed two young Kurdish women in London discussing it with scepticism. “I don’t want to hear about another peace process. I remember what happened the last time they talked about peace,” one of them said. She was referring to the large-scale contention that erupted in 2015 when the peace negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish government collapsed. That failure triggered a violent escalation, resulting in mass casualties and intense urban warfare.
The breakdown occurred in the context of changing regional dynamics related to the Syrian civil war and political shifts after the June 2015 elections, when Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 2002, leading to a coalition with the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Since the failure of this process, Turkey has experienced significant democratic decline, with increased restrictions on media and civil society, institutional control and widespread detention of opposition figures, journalists, and politicians.
The new process a decade later
Is the process different this time? The current initiative emerged out of the blue when MHP leader and government ally Devlet Bahçeli proposed that Öcalan should address parliament to announce his organisation’s dissolution. Bahçeli’s proposal in late October suggested Öcalan might “benefit from a right to hope” by publicly announcing the end of the PKK’s insurgency. This represented a remarkable departure from the MHP’s longstanding position, which had previously advocated Öcalan’s execution and rejected any form of dialogue with the PKK. These initial steps paved the way for a series of meetings between Öcalan and pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party representatives.
Later, in his statement delivered through the DEM Party delegation, Öcalan called the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve itself. Rather than articulating specific demands, he gave considerable attention to a historical analysis of the PKK’s formation, placing its emergence within the context of Cold War dynamics and the systematic suppression of democratic channels. The statement’s strategic omission of concrete demands introduced an ambiguity, potentially to enhance its acceptance across distinct political groups.
The road ahead
What the following steps are is unclear from Öcalan’s statement. With the PKK announcing a ceasefire, the ball is now in the court of the ruling coalition. During the previous process, there were hopes that a momentum for peace would lead to democratisation through increased political participation. While the statement emphasises this need, in reality, there is great suspicion.
Journalists, politicians, and civil society activists are constantly under threat in today’s Turkey. DEM Party and some CHP mayors have been dismissed on terrorism-related allegations and replaced with government trustees. One of Turkey’s popular journalists, Nevşin Mengü, was sentenced to prison for interviewing ex-PYD leader Salih Muslim; many others are behind bars. Istanbul Mayor İmamoğlu and several other CHP (Republican People’s Party) district mayors have also faced arrests or various forms of repression, including criminal indictments.
Why is the Turkish government enabling this process ?
One theory suggests Erdoğan seeks DEM Party support to secure his presidency as he lacks a supermajority to be re-elected. It is visible that Erdoğan is seeking to expand his influence by recruiting opposition figures, as seen with Serap Yazıcı, a law professor and Future Party founding member who recently joined his party. This is because to run for president again, he either needs an early election or a constitutional amendment removing term limits. However, DEM Party has shown no indication of supporting him.
Furthermore, Erdoğan’s political strategy is shaped around establishing himself as a crucial figure in resolving regional and global crises. Just as he positions himself as the key mediator in the Ukraine- Russia conflict, particularly through his role in facilitating the grain deal, Erdogan seeks to reinforce the narrative that only he can resolve such complex challenges. A peace deal could form part of a wider strategy to stabilise Syria’s geopolitical landscape and amplify his role as a strong leader.
Similarly, it can be argued that the timing, coinciding with developments in Syria, is not coincidental. Turkey is seeking to weaken the influence of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition primarily led by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), during Syria’s ongoing transition. While the YPG asserts its independence from the PKK, both groups embrace Öcalan’s ideology and share historical convergence. Turkey has continually refused to accept their distinction, which has paved the way to legitimise its military actions in SDF-held territories in Syria. The extent to which a peace process with the PKK might shift Turkey’s stance on the group remains unclear. Figures like Salih Muslim and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi welcomed Öcalan’s PKK’s disarmament call positively while underlining their autonomy. A more hopeful outlook can suggest that an agreement with the PKK could greatly reduce security tensions between Turkey and the SDF, marking an important step towards regional stability.
Overall, there are significant challenges regarding PKK fighters’ and Öcalan’s fate along with government commitment. Consequently, while the call for peace is a positive development, it is marked by uncertainty. Support from international actors can make this process stronger. European states, notably Germany, have echoed the CHP’s call for a parliament-led process, representing a promising diplomatic engagement. However, as issues like the transition of former combatants to civilian life remain unclear, especially with the opposition’s historical resistance to Kurdish cultural rights, it is for certain that the peace attempt will remain a deeply contentious issue.
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