Political analyst and the executive director of IstanPol Institute, charts Turkey’s autocratization under AKP rule and address the strategies adopted by its political opposition and the opportunities and risks it faces in the run-up to the June 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections.
Seren Selvin Korkmaz / The Middle East Institute
Introduction
Turkey has undergone a major economic, social, and political transformation during the two decades of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) rule. Despite its early democratization efforts during the European Union (EU) accession negotiations and various political and judicial reforms, the AKP has since become the main driver of rising autocratization in Turkey.
Turkey is now categorized as a “competitive authoritarian” regime,1 where elections are held regularly but the competition among political parties is not free and fair. These regimes have ostensibly democratic elements: Opposition parties occasionally win or almost win elections; there is fierce political competition; the press may publish diverse opinions and statements by opposition parties; and citizens can organize protests.
However, upon closer inspection, cracks soon appear in the democratic facade: Opponents of the government are stifled via legal or illegal means; independent judicial bodies are controlled by pro-government officials; state funds are used for election campaigns without proper oversight; election rules are changed to favor the government and elections may even be rigged; and press freedom and freedom of expression come under pressure. When these measures fail to deliver an outcome that satisfies the ruling party, members of the opposition may face targeted violence or imprisonment — an increasingly common reality for the Turkish opposition since 2007. Therefore, any opposition victory depends on its ability to successfully develop new ways to mobilize under these difficult conditions.
In competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition parties have a higher chance of winning elections if they form an electoral alliance. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has thus far enjoyed a fragmented opposition and utilized polarization to cement divisions. However, the introduction of a hyper-presidential system following the 2017 referendum and Erdoğan’s 2018 election victory have provided the necessary impetus for the opposition parties to form an alliance. As Turkey experiences a biting economic crisis, polls indicate that voter support for the opposition parties is a threat to Erdoğan and his ally, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP).
This paper first charts Turkey’s autocratization under AKP rule, before addressing the strategies adopted by its political opposition and the opportunities and risks it faces in the run-up to the June 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. The opposition’s strategy focuses on creating a strong electoral alliance to ensure a parliamentary majority, nominating a joint presidential candidate, and creating an inclusive platform to draw in AKP and MHP voters who are not happy with the country’s recent trajectory. Meanwhile, Erdoğan has attempted to disrupt the opposition by amending the election law and increasingly targeting key opposition actors and journalists, while also taking advantage of the Russia-Ukraine war to position himself as an indispensable international actor. Although Erdoğan’s approach to domestic and international politics suggests he is not willing to give up easily, opposition parties appear determined to defeat him.
Autocratization Under AKP Rule
To understand the fundamental problems facing Turkey’s opposition, we must first examine how we got here and analyze how the regime has changed over time.
During its first term, the AKP took steps toward democratization by passing political and judicial reforms. However, during its second term, the party began to consolidate control over political institutions and the bureaucracy.2 There were already problems regarding judicial independence, but instead of fixing the system, the AKP took politicization of the judiciary to a whole new level. The constitutional reforms ratified in a 2010 referendum significantly undermined judicial independence and increased the government’s influence over the judiciary.3
At the same time, Erdoğan leaned into populism and further entrenched existing societal divisions. The government’s violent response to the Gezi Park protests in 2013 intensified social polarization and tensions. During the June 2015 general elections, the first elections after the Gezi Park protests, the AKP lost its parliamentary majority; however, the parties were unable to form a government because Erdoğan actively blocked coalition talks and called for snap elections that fall. From June to November 2015, violence escalated across Turkey alongside armed conflict between Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in majority-Kurdish cities. At the end of a period marked by growing security concerns, the AKP regained its parliamentary majority in the November 2015 elections, amid mounting problems over electoral justice and impartiality. Erdoğan had hoped to win the election by capitalizing on a security crisis of his own making and convincing people to vote for stability, and he succeeded.
The coup attempt on July 15, 2016 was another critical moment for the government to consolidate power by further suppressing the opposition and forming a new alliance with the ultranationalist MHP to solidify its parliamentary majority. After the coup attempt, the government declared a state of emergency, during which people from various political factions suffered major human rights violations and all parliamentary authority was effectively transferred to Erdoğan.
Turkey’s government system transformed into a de facto semi-presidential system after the constitutional amendments in 2010; after the referendum in 2017, it became a hyper-presidential system devoid of checks and balances. Under the new system, the parliament became dysfunctional as its powers were mainly transferred to the head of the executive branch. This system made it difficult for the opposition parties, in spite of their significant numbers in parliament, to impact governance decisions and conduct oversight of other government branches. This new system only benefited those at the top, including Erdoğan’s family, leading AKP officials, and allied businesses. Institutions have been hollowed out under one-man rule, and clientelism and patronage have made the system even more inefficient.4
Moreover, ever since the unfavorable results of the June 2015 elections, the government has extended its control over the media and civil society. It has also doubled down on its marginalization of the Kurdish people by declaring the end of the “Kurdish Solution Process” and violently targeting the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratrik Partisi, HDP).5 Many HDP legislators, including Co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdag, as well as many HDP mayors and party activists, have been imprisoned. In response to the HDP’s overwhelming victories across Kurdish municipalities in the March 2019 local elections, the government struck back with more suppression and purges of HDP mayors, to the extent that most HDP-run municipalities are now run by government-appointed “trustees.”6
As a result, over the years, the AKP has created a competitive authoritarian regime that justifies itself with the rhetoric of political populism. As the AKP positioned itself as the sole representative of the nation, it completely disregarded and undermined the legitimacy of many opposition groups, further deepening political and social polarization in Turkey while consolidating its control over the state. Using its parliamentary majority and the hyper-presidential system, it introduced new legislation to stifle political and social opposition and to undermine fundamental rights and freedoms.7 Therefore, the opposition faces both deepening polarization and political and legal sanctions.
The Opposition’s Main Strategies Under Erdoğan’s Rule
The opposition actors and alliances have also changed throughout the dynamic autocratization process, searching for new strategies and approaches while navigating the slippery terrain of politics. Just as some opposition actors or parties have chosen to build alliances with the AKP, some of the ruling party’s former allies have also joined the opposition’s ranks. As the opposition struggled to operate within an increasingly polarized political landscape and survive amid a crackdown on fundamental freedoms, at times it fell into the pitfalls of polarization while mobilizing voters to amass some political power.
By learning from its past experiences, both successes and failures, the Turkish opposition adopted a new strategy that brought it victory in the 2019 local elections. This strategy has two main pillars: forming electoral alliances to ensure unity against Erdoğan and using new discursive strategies to counter his polarizing discourse.
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