The latest crackdown on Turkey’s CHP highlights how governments under competitive authoritarianism seek to weaken and redesign opposition movements, argues Arife Köse of the University of East Anglia.
In recent months, Turkey’s main opposition party has faced mounting political and judicial pressure. The CHP’s rise in the 2024 local elections, when it surpassed the AKP nationally for the first time in two decades, positioned the party as a genuine threat to President Erdoğan’s dominance. Since then, prosecutors and courts have intensified scrutiny of the CHP’s internal affairs, demonstrating that the government is seeking to destabilize the party through legal channels.
Turkey Recap Editor-in-Chief Diego Cupolo was in conversation with Arife Köse, a researcher at the University of East Anglia, about the latest crackdown on Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP, and what it reveals about the strategies of competitive authoritarian regimes.
In her conversation Köse explained this pressure has taken multiple forms. Corruption probes and irregularities cases have been launched against CHP officials and party congresses. Each of these moves has forced the party into a defensive posture, diverting energy from policymaking and municipal governance to survival.
In September 21, Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP, held an extraordinary Erdoğans to re-elect its leader, Özgür Özel. The gathering was prompted by internal disputes and legal challenges that threatened Özel’s position, amid allegations of irregularities in earlier votes. By renewing his mandate, the congress aimed to block possible court rulings that could unseat him.
However, the stakes go beyond party leadership. Turkey’s judiciary is widely viewed as politicized, with rulings often aligning with the interests of President Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Opposition figures fear that Özel could be forced out and replaced by former chair Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who led the party for 13 years but failed in multiple elections and is unpopular with much of the electorate.
As Köse explains “The real question is not only whether Özel can keep his seat, but whether the CHP can consolidate its gains and present itself as a credible governing alternative or whether judicial intervention and internal divisions will trap the party in crisis management.”
The Road to Crisis
The conversation situates the current showdown in two critical developments.
The 2023 Presidential Election. The opposition’s joint candidate lost to Erdoğan, sparking an internal reckoning within the CHP. In the November 2023 party congress, reformist challengers failed to dislodge the old guard, and Özel emerged as the new leader.
The 2024 Local Elections. For the first time in two decades, the CHP overtook the AKP nationally, winning 37.8 percent of the vote to the AKP’s 35 percent. More importantly, it captured 14 major municipalities including Ankara and Istanbul. These cities had long been the backbone of Erdoğan’s political machine.
“This was a huge turning point,” Köse said. “Erdoğan has always been obsessed with controlling municipalities. Losing Istanbul and Ankara again was a massive defeat.”
The government struck back. This explains why in March 2025, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu was arrested, followed by at least 15 CHP mayors. “These were some of CHP’s strongest figures,” Köse noted. “By targeting them, the regime removed the party’s best talent from the field.”
Designing the Opposition
Köse describes Erdoğan’s strategy as “designing the opposition.”
“Erdoğan knows he cannot simply cancel elections. He needs them for legitimacy. But instead of only manipulating elections, he is now trying to shape the opposition itself,” she explaines on the show.
The method is subtle but effective. Rather than banning the CHP outright, the government overwhelms it with lawsuits, corruption probes, and internal disruptions. This keeps the party bogged down in legal wrangling and internal disputes while Erdoğan stages international appearances as Turkey’s indispensable leader.
The optics matter. “On one screen you see Erdoğan in New York meeting world leaders, while CHP leaders are in courtrooms defending themselves. It makes the opposition look weak, even if the reality is different,” she notes.
Lessons Beyond Turkey
Köse also stresses that these developments resonate far beyond Turkey’s borders.
“Authoritarians learn from each other. Erdoğan studies Orbán, Trump studies Erdoğan. What is happening in Turkey could easily happen elsewhere,” she says. “Look at how Trump talks about Manhattan DA Alvin Bragg. It is not hard to imagine a U.S. scenario where opposition figures are neutralized by endless legal harassment.”
Turkey has long been classified as a “competitive authoritarian” state, where elections are formally free but not fair. Yet the lateset shift goes deeper which is about not just manipulating elections but manipulating who gets to run.
How Is the CHP Responding?
Despite mounting pressure, Özel and the CHP have not been passive. Since March, the party has organized weekly rallies (over 50 to date) drawing large crowds in both Istanbul and Anatolian cities.
“This wasn’t something the regime expected,” Köse observes. “The CHP is showing resilience. These rallies create a counter-image to the arrests, showing that people are still mobilized.”
The congresses also serve a dual function: on the one hand, they safeguard Özel’s leadership by preempting legal interventions; on the other, they energize the base and project legitimacy.
Polls suggest this legitimacy is real. According to a recent KONDA survey, 69 percent of Turkish voters (including non-CHP supporters) believe Özel should remain party leader.
The challenge, Köse cautions, is turning this mobilization into sustainable political strength. “The CHP needs to expand its grassroots networks. Every village, every small town must feel connected to the party. Otherwise, rallies alone won’t be enough to win the next general election.”
The Road Ahead
The October 24 court date looms large, but the broader contest is about whether Turkey’s opposition can withstand a strategy designed to fracture and weaken it.
“The regime is forcing CHP into constant crisis management—legal battles, internal divisions, leadership questions. At the same time, Erdoğan is exploiting long-standing public doubts that the CHP can actually govern Turkey,” Köse concludes.
Yet the opposition’s persistence in holding congresses, organizing rallies, and presenting policy programs suggests it is not ready to surrender. Whether this energy can be converted into electoral victory remains the central question of Turkish politics today.