Following Özgür Özel’s announcement of the YENİ Party, debate has focused on which voters it might attract, where it will position itself ideologically and how much it could grow. Drawing on a survey conducted with support from the University of Aberdeen, Dr Aykut Öztürk and Dr Diğdem Soyaltın-Colella examine the party’s potential, prospective electorate and voters’ expectations.
This article was originally published in Diken. Click here to read the original.
Dr Aykut Öztürk (University of Glasgow)
Dr Diğdem Soyaltın-Colella (University of Aberdeen)
On Tuesday, 21 July, Özgür Özel announced the establishment of the YENİ Party. Since then, the character of the new party has been the subject of considerable public debate.
Which voters are likely to support it? Will it be a centrist party, or will it position itself on the left? What is its potential? What do voters expect from it?
To answer these questions, immediately after the historic announcement we asked voters whether they would consider voting for Özgür Özel’s new party, how excited they were by the announcement and what they expected from the YENİ Party. We also measured various characteristics of the respondents. In total, more than 1,500 people participated in the survey.
The research was funded by the University of Aberdeen. Segmenta Research conducted the survey between 22 and 24 July using an online panel. We applied demographic and political weighting to make the results representative of Turkey’s population.
What, then, does the survey tell us about the voters most likely to support the YENİ Party?
Our data suggest that, at least for now, the YENİ Party is not positioned to overcome Turkey’s existing political polarisation and attract support from every section of society. It does, however, have considerable potential to become the centre of the democratic opposition and to reach opposition voters outside the CHP, as well as those who do not currently vote. Voters expect the party to be transparent and honest, restore democracy and justice in Turkey, and address the country’s economic problems.
What Is Its Potential?
Overall, 38 per cent of respondents said they might consider voting for the YENİ Party. Forty-one per cent said they definitely would not vote for it, while 20 per cent did not express a clear opinion.
As many other political scientists have noted, these findings must be interpreted cautiously. They do not mean that the YENİ Party would receive 40 per cent of the vote in a possible early election, since voters’ interest in a new party can be volatile. Nevertheless, assuming that it can withstand authoritarian pressures, the results indicate the level of support that the party might reach with the right policies. For a newly established political party, this represents considerable potential.
The İmamoğlu Factor
To identify the most distinctive factor behind voter interest in the YENİ Party, we included more than ten variables in a single statistical model. The answer was clear: affinity with Ekrem İmamoğlu.
In other words, if you wanted to predict whether a voter would support the YENİ Party by asking only one question, you could ask what they think of İmamoğlu. This also suggests that the events beginning on 19 March, namely, the investigations into Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, have created a new political rupture in Turkey.
The Centre of the Democratic Opposition?
Voters’ support for the YENİ Party is also closely related to the extent to which they consider Turkey democratic. Seven out of ten voters who rate the quality of Turkish democracy below average say they might vote for the YENİ Party. Among those who regard it as above average, this falls to two out of ten.
The same pattern appears in relation to voters’ democratic ideals. Six out of ten voters who believe rule by a strong leader would be bad for Turkey say they might vote for the YENİ Party. Among those who regard strong-leader rule as beneficial, this falls to three out of ten.
Being a democrat and, above all, believing that Turkey is not currently a democracy is therefore one of the principal predictors of support for the YENİ Party. This is consistent with Özel’s repeated call for a “coalition of democrats.”
Will the YENİ Party Become Another ANAP?
One question surrounding the YENİ Party is whether it will resemble the Motherland Party (ANAP) as a centrist party or position itself on the left. Our data reveal a strong relationship between interest in the YENİ Party and identifying with the left. Among those who place themselves on the right, three out of ten feel close to the YENİ Party. Among those who identify with the left, this rises to six out of ten. The YENİ Party’s prospective electorate is therefore clearly situated on the left.
Significantly, its prospective voters are positioned to the left not only of the Turkish electorate as a whole but also of the average CHP voter in 2024.
One reason for this debate is that some commentators associate Ekrem İmamoğlu, one of the YENİ Party’s founding figures, with the centre-right. Our data, however, show a very strong relationship between identifying with the left and supporting İmamoğlu. Voters’ perceptions of İmamoğlu therefore bear little resemblance to the claims made by some political commentators.
Who Is Turning to the YENİ Party Apart from CHP Voters?
Seventy per cent of CHP voters say they might consider voting for the YENİ Party, while 15 per cent remain undecided. These figures are almost identical to the findings of a survey conducted two months ago by Segmenta Research for Işık University’s Emotics Lab. It therefore appears that most CHP voters have turned towards the YENİ Party and that this tendency is relatively durable.
In which direction, then, might the YENİ Party expand?
Interest is very low among voters who remain within the People’s Alliance, namely, supporters of the AKP and MHP. Taking the survey’s margin of error into account, the figure of just over 10 per cent suggests that support from the People’s Alliance is currently negligible.
The findings concerning other parties are more striking. Among DEM Party voters, interest exceeds 40 per cent. Some sections of the DEM Party electorate (particularly rural voters and those with low literacy levels) tend to be underrepresented in survey samples, so this high figure should be treated cautiously.
Nevertheless, considering the current political environment, we conclude that the YENİ Party could become a significant point of attraction for urban, opposition-minded DEM Party voters. Those who believe that the DEM Party leadership, which has recently appeared more accommodating towards the government, no longer represents them adequately may play a particularly important role.
Another finding reinforces this interpretation: the relationship between positive attitudes towards İmamoğlu and support for the YENİ Party is strongest among DEM Party voters. In other words, the sympathy for İmamoğlu that we know exists among DEM Party supporters is being channelled directly towards the YENİ Party.
There is also considerable interest among supporters of the İYİ Party and the New Welfare Party, which is no longer part of the People’s Alliance. However, their expectations concerning the Kurdish question differ substantially from those of DEM Party voters. Managing these competing expectations will be one of the YENİ Party’s principal strategic challenges. Mansur Yavaş’s relationship with the new party will also be critical in this respect.
What Kind of Party Do Voters Want?
Finally, we asked participants an open-ended question about their expectations of the YENİ Party. Some described the kind of party they wanted it to become, while others explained what they wanted it to achieve. We received more than 1,000 responses.
Among those who described the kind of party they wanted, transparency emerged as the most prominent demand. Expressed by supporters of all parties, it was frequently associated with honesty, merit, justice and combating corruption.
For example, one CHP voter said: “It must be a very transparent party, because incidents involving fraud and criminal activity have increased recently, and the government makes very effective use of them.” An AKP voter said they expected “a fair, transparent and honest approach that supports working people.”
One possible lesson is that the YENİ Party should develop unprecedented mechanisms of transparency and accountability and build its political brand around them. Such measures would be particularly meaningful in the face of the government’s continuing judicial operations.
Ideologically, we also see a strong demand particularly among voters with a CHP background for the YENİ Party to be ” a pro-Ataturk party.” To a certain extent, this demand is also present among supporters of other opposition parties.
Some nationalist voters outside the CHP want the party to distance itself from the DEM Party. DEM Party voters, by contrast, expect the YENİ Party to pursue a rights-based solution to the Kurdish question. These contrasting demands illustrate the ideological balance that the new party will need to maintain.
Voters without a CHP background also emphasise political style. They want civility, seriousness and inclusive political communication. Statements such as “They should stop quarrelling,” “They should not make promises they cannot keep,” and “They should use language that embraces everyone” show that voters care not only about what is said but also how it is expressed. This suggests that the confrontational and combative rhetoric welcomed by the party’s core supporters may alienate voters beyond its existing base.
What Do Voters Want the YENİ Party to Achieve?
There are also divisions among voters over what the YENİ Party should accomplish. Across all groups, the most frequently expressed demand concerns justice and the rule of law. However, the meaning attached to this demand varies between different groups of voters.
Among those with a CHP background, justice is expressed directly as a demand for regime change. Many participants summarised their expectations simply as “rights, law and justice” or “justice.” Others were more specific, calling for “remedies for those victimised by emergency decrees,” “an independent judiciary” and “the restoration of the rule of law.”
Correspondingly, CHP voters express a strong demand for a return to the parliamentary system. This is generally associated with the rule of law, the separation of powers and democracy, and is regarded as a symbol of institutional normalisation.
Among AKP supporters and other voters, by contrast, justice is more closely connected to everyday life and economic problems.
One AKP voter described their expectations of the YENİ Party as follows: “Perhaps it will be good; it should stand with ordinary and disadvantaged people, act justly and ensure that those who do not currently receive assistance are also entitled to it.”
Another said: “There should be justice, opportunities should be opened up for young people, and children should receive a proper education. Restrictions should be imposed on the wealthy; nobody should be allowed to own more than two houses. I am a mother and I am afraid for my daughter’s future. We need justice.” In this account, justice emerges as an overarching framework for the voter’s demands concerning the country.
Economic concerns are therefore widely expressed, but different groups articulate them in different ways. Among voters without a CHP background in particular, economic demands are more concrete and closely connected to daily life. Statements such as “The lowest pension should be raised to the level of the minimum wage,” “The cost-of-living crisis must end,” and “It should find a solution to supermarket prices” appear repeatedly.
Among voters with a CHP background, by contrast, economic demands are generally expressed alongside calls for a change of political regime, reflecting the expectation that political change would also improve the economy.