As Europe experiences another summer marked by record-breaking temperatures, the debate over how to tackle climate change has intensified. While scientists continue to stress the urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, a growing discussion among political economists suggests that the greatest obstacle to climate action may not be technological or economic, it may be political.
A recent analysis by Aidan Regan, Hanna Schwander, Cyril Benoît and Tim Vlandas argues that climate policy has focused extensively on emissions, economic models and decarbonisation strategies while paying far less attention to a crucial question: can ambitious climate policies survive democratic politics?
Their article responds to a roadmap developed by leading economists, including Joseph Stiglitz, Thomas Piketty, Jayati Ghosh, Kate Raworth and Jason Hickel, which advocates moving beyond economic growth as the organising principle of modern economies. While acknowledging the report’s strong diagnosis of climate change and inequality, the authors argue that its proposed solutions overlook the realities of electoral politics.
The Political Challenge Behind Climate Policy
According to the authors, governments cannot implement climate policies in isolation from public opinion. Democratic leaders must continually secure electoral support, making political legitimacy as important as environmental ambition.
Economic growth, they argue, has long served as more than an indicator of prosperity. It underpins tax revenues, finances welfare systems, supports public investment and reassures financial markets. More importantly, it enables governments to promise improved living standards without requiring significant redistribution between social groups.
When economic growth slows, however, politics changes. Instead of distributing expanding prosperity, governments are forced to decide who bears the costs. The authors contend that voters consistently punish governments during periods of economic stagnation, making deliberate economic contraction an exceptionally difficult political strategy.
Can Degrowth Win Elections?
Rather than disputing the environmental case for reducing consumption, the article questions whether degrowth can realistically become an electoral platform.
The authors note that while conferences and academic debates have generated growing support for post-growth ideas, no major democratic government has successfully campaigned on a programme centred around deliberate economic contraction.
This, they argue, represents the central weakness of degrowth—not its environmental logic, but its political feasibility.
The concern is that climate policies perceived as reducing living standards could strengthen political movements that frame environmental action as an elite project imposed on ordinary citizens.
Lessons from France
To illustrate this challenge, the authors revisit France’s 2018 gilets jaunes (Yellow Vest) protests.
The government’s increase in fuel taxes, introduced partly for environmental reasons, triggered widespread demonstrations and eventually forced a policy reversal. Although critics acknowledged that the measure disproportionately affected lower-income households, the episode demonstrated how poorly designed climate policies can generate political backlash.
For the authors, the lesson is not that climate action should be abandoned, but that it must be designed in ways that maintain public support.
A Different Vision: “Degrowth for the Rich”
Rather than rejecting growth altogether, the authors propose a more politically viable alternative that targets excessive consumption among the wealthiest households while allowing broader society to benefit from green economic transformation.
They argue that affluent consumers, whose lifestyles generate disproportionately high carbon emissions, should bear a greater share of the transition.
Meanwhile, climate policy should deliver tangible improvements for most citizens through secure employment, public investment, industrial strategy and expanded public services.
In this vision, decarbonisation becomes associated with better jobs, improved infrastructure and greater economic security rather than sacrifice.
Rebuilding State Capacity
The article also highlights the importance of rebuilding state institutions capable of directing economic transformation.
Instead of relying primarily on market incentives or carbon pricing, the authors advocate stronger industrial policies, public investment banks and long-term planning to accelerate the transition to clean industries.
Historical examples such as post-war France, Japan and Denmark are presented as evidence that democratic states have previously combined active industrial policy with economic growth. Similar strategies, they suggest, could underpin the next phase of climate transition.
Climate Politics Beyond Economics
Ultimately, the article argues that climate debates have concentrated heavily on scientific evidence and economic modelling while underestimating the role of democratic politics.
The authors maintain that successful climate action must build broad electoral coalitions rather than relying solely on technically optimal policy proposals. Without public support, even the most ambitious environmental programmes risk becoming politically unsustainable.
As governments seek pathways towards net-zero emissions, the debate increasingly centres not only on what policies are necessary, but also on which policies citizens are prepared to support.
This article is based on and discusses arguments presented by Aidan Regan, Hanna Schwander, Cyril Benoît and Tim Vlandas in “The challenge with climate action is not about the maths – it is about the politics,” originally published on the LSE EUROPP blog. It paraphrases and analyses the authors’ arguments without reproducing the original text.